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Abstract
Under the assumption of bounded rationality, economic agents learn
from their past mistaken predictions by combining new and old informa-
tion to form new beliefs. The purpose of this paper is to examine how the
policy-maker, by aﬀecting private agents’ learning process, determines the
speed at which the economy converges to the rational expectation equilib-
rium. I ﬁnd that by reacting strongly to private agents’ expected inﬂation,
a central bank would increase the speed of convergence.
I assess the relevance of the transition period when looking at a cri-
terion for evaluating monetary policy decisions and suggest that a fast
convergence is not always suitable.
1 Introduction
There is wide consensus on the fact that monetary policy may aﬀect real vari-
ables in the short run. One recent strand of research that has obtained this result
explicitly incorporating frictions in a dynamic general equilibrium framework,
gives a central role for forecasts of future courses of the economy (Clarida, Gal´ ı
and Gertler, 1999 and Woodford, 2003). This litterature has been conducted
under the rational expectations hypothesis, meaning that agents do not make
systematic forecasting errors and their guesses about the future are on average
correct.
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1Many recent models in the analysis of economic policy emphasize, however,
that the RE assumption should not be taken for granted, since expectations
can be out of equilibrium at least for a period of time. It can be argued,
for example, that in the presence of policy regime change the public needs to
learn about the new regime: in the early stages of this process, previously
held public beliefs could lead to biased predictions. For this reason there is
now a substantial interest on the question of whether RE can be attained as the
outcome of a learning process. Analyses on monetary policy and learning (Evans
and Honkapohja, 2002a, 2002b, 2003 and Bullard and Mitra, 2002) suggest that
economic policies should be designed to be conducive to long-run convergence
of private expectations to rational expectations (E-Stability)1,i no r d e rt oa v o i d
asymptotic instability in the economy. These works are extensively devoted
to the study of the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium attainable under
learning. A small but growing body of litterature is concerned with the dynamic
properties along the convergence process. Papers centred on the analysis of the
transition to the REE include Marcet and Sargent (1995), Timmerman (1996),
Sargent (1999), Marcet and Nicolini (2003), Giannitsarou (2003), Aoki and
Nikolov (2003) and Orphanides and Williams (2003).
The purpose of this work is to examine how the policy-maker, by aﬀecting
private agents’ learning process, can inﬂuence the transition to the rational
expectations equilibrium. I show that policies driving the economy to the same
asymptotic REE may imply very diﬀerent transitional dynamics. By reacting
strongly to expected inﬂation, a central bank can shorten the transition and
increase the speed of convergence to the REE. This is particularly relevant when
policy decisions aim to inﬂuence social welfare: if policy-makers know that after
a regime change private agents’ expected inﬂation would be higher than the
REE, they can substantially increase social welfare by choosing a policy that
reacts strongly to expected inﬂation. If, instead, perceived inﬂation is initially
lower than the REE, a weak response to expected inﬂation and a slow transition
might be preferable.
In order to study the transition in the learning process to the REE I adapt
arguments described by Marcet and Sargent (1995), which in turn are based on
the theoretical results of Benveniste, Metivier and Priouret (1990).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the monetary policy
problem, describing the learning dynamics under two diﬀerent policy rules. The
section ends showing that under the optimal RE discretionary policy, transition
to the REE is very slow. In section 3 I show how policies could be characterized
by evaluating the speed of converges to the REE. In section 4 I study policies
that allow the central bank to shorten (or extend) the transition without af-
fecting the long-run equilibrium (i.e., the REE equilibrium) and in section 5 I
analyze how these policies inﬂuence social welfare. Section 6 summarizes and
concludes.
1An earlier paper by Howitt (1992) had already shown that under some interest rate rules
the rational expectation equilibrium is not learnable.
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2.1 The baseline model
Much of the recent theoretical analysis on monetary policy has been conducted
under the “New Phillips curve” paradigm reviewed in Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler
(1999) and Woodford (2003). The baseline framework is a dynamic general
equilibrium model with money and temporary nominal price rigidities. I con-
sider the linearized reduced form of the economy with competitive monopolistic
ﬁrms, staggered prices and private agents that maximize intertemporal utility.
From the private agents’ point of view there is an intertemporal IS curve2
xt = E∗
t xt+1 − ϕ(it − E∗
t πt+1)+gt (2.1)
and an aggregate supply (AS) modeled by an expectations-augmented Phillips
curve3:
πt = αxt + βE∗
t πt+1, (2.2)
where xt is the output gap, measured as the log deviation of actual output (yt)
from potential output (zt) (i.e., the level of output that would arise if wages
and prices were perfectly competitive and ﬂexible), πt is actual inﬂation at time
t, E∗
t πt+1 is the level of inﬂation expected by private agents for period t +1 ,
given the information at time t. Similarly E∗
t xt+1 is the level of the output
gap that private agents expect for period t + 1, given the information at time
t.Iw r i t eE∗
t to indicate that expectations need not be rational (Et without ∗
denotes RE); it is the short-term nominal interest rate and is taken to be the







In order to complete the model, it is necessary to specify how the interest
rate is settled and how agents form beliefs. I consider the nominal interest
rate as the policy instrument and model it by means of a reaction function,
that is, a functional relationship between a dependent variable (the interest
rate) and some endogenous (expected inﬂation and output gap) and exogenous
(shocks) variables. I consider three cases. I start with a simple expectations-
based policy rule that helps me to introduce in a very simple and intuitive
way the concept of speed of convergence. Then, I describe the optimal RE
policy under discretion derived in Evans and Honkapohja (2002)4. Finally, I
2The IS relationship approximates the Euler equation characterizing optimal aggregate
consumption choices and the parameter ϕ can be interpreted as the rate of intertemporal
substitution.
3The AS relation approximates aggregate pricing emerging from monopolistically compet-
itive ﬁrms’ optimal behaviour in Calvo’s model of staggered price determination. Here I’m
not considering cost-push shocks. Introducing cost-push shocks, would not change substan-
tially the results on speed of convergence and the role of policy decisions along the transition.
However, in section 5 I analyze brieﬂy results in terms of welfare also in presence of cost-push
shocks.
4I leave for future research a general study of the transition of learning process for monetary
policy problem under commitment
3introduce a set of expectations-based policy rules and show how to characterize
the elements of this set, using a measure of the speed of convergence.
Concerning beliefs, I start each analysis by considering the rational expec-
tations hypothesis in order to focus and discuss subsequently the implications
of bounded rationality.
2.2 A simple expectations-based reaction function
It has long been recognized that monetary policy needs a forward-looking di-
mension. Let us assume that the central bank, in order to set the current
interest rate, uses simple policy rules that feed back from expected values of
future inﬂation and output gap
it = γ + γxE∗
t xt+1 + γπE∗
t πt+1. (2.3)
The class of expectations-based reaction functions that I ﬁrst consider has
γx = 1
ϕ in order to simplify the interaction between actual and expected vari-
ables. Under (2.3), in fact, the economy evolves according to the following
system of equations:
Yt = Q + FE∗
























and neither the IS nor the AS are aﬀected by expectations on output gap5.
Under rational expectations (i.e. E∗
t xt+1 = Etxt+1 and E∗
t πt+1 = Etπt+1)
it has been shown that the dynamic system deﬁned by (2.4) has a unique non-
explosive equilibrium (Bullard and Mitra, 2002). In particular, assuming for
simplicity6 that ρg = 0, the equilibrium can be written as a linear function of a
constant and the shock
πt = aπ + αgt and xt = ax + gt, (2.6)
while agents’ forecasts are just constant
Etπt+1 = aπ and Etxt+1 = ax. (2.7)
5For a more general class of expectations-based policy rules without restrictions on γx I
refer to section 3.
6Considering an i.i.d stochastic process instead of an AR(1) does not aﬀect the results
on speed of convergence. However, since the litterature usually consider AR(1) shocks, the
welfare analysis in section 5 is obtained assuming a persistent demand shock.
42.2.1 Adaptive Learning
Let us assume now that private agents form expectations by learning from
past experiences and update their forecasts through recursive least squares es-
timates7.
Since, under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3), neither
the IS nor the AS relations depend on expected output gap, the system under
learning can be described by focusing directly on beliefs regarding expected
inﬂation8.
I assume that agents do not know the eﬀective value of aπ in equation (2.5),
but estimate it using past information. In this case, private agents’ expected
inﬂation is given by:
E∗
t πt+1 = aπ,t, (2.8)
where aπ,t is a statistic inferred recursively from past data according to
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t−1 (πt−1 − aπ,t−1). (2.9)
Forecasts are updated by a term that depends on the last prediction error9
weighted by the gain sequence t−1. It is well known that in this case the adaptive
procedure is the result of a least squares regression of inﬂa t i o no nac o n s t a n t ,







An important aspect of recursive learning is that agents’ beliefs may converge
to RE, i.e., the estimated parameters aπ,t may converge asymptotically to aπ.
The E-Stability principle (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) provide conditions for
asymptotic stability of the REE under least squares learning.
Before analyzing speed of convergence I describe brieﬂy E-stability, since the
building blocks of the two concepts are the same. The stability under learning
(E-stability) of a particular equilibrium, is addressed by studying the mapping
from the estimated parameters, i.e., the perceived law of motion (PLM), to the
true data generating process, i.e., the actual law of motion (ALM).
When expectations in system (2.4) evolve according to expression (2.8), the
inﬂation’s ALM is
πt = T (aπ,t)+αgt, (2.11)
where
T (aπ,t)=−αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ,t (2.12)
is the mapping from PLM to ALM of inﬂation.
7See Marcet and Sargent (1989 a, b) or Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for a detailed analysis
of least squares learning.
8In the next section I show formally that this does not aﬀect the results.
9This formula implies that private agents do not use today’s inﬂation to formulate their
forecasts. The assumption is made purely for convenience and it is often made in models of
learning as it simpliﬁes solving the model. The dynamics of the model are unlikely to change.
5As shown in Marcet and Sargent (1999a,b) and Evans and Honkapohja
(2001), it turns out that the dynamic system described by equations (2.9),




= h(aπ)=T (aπ) − aπ, (2.13)
where τ denotes “notional” or “artiﬁcial” time and h(aπ) is the asymptotic
mean prediction error, i.e. the mean distance between the ALM and the PLM:
h(aπ) = lim
t→∞[T (aπ,t) − aπ,t]. (2.14)
The REE is said to be E-stable if it is locally asymptotically stable under
equation (2.14) and under some regularity conditions. In our example E-stability
conditions are readly obtained by computing the derivative of the ODE with
respect to aπ and checking wether it is smaller than zero10.
2.2.2 Speed of convergence to the REE
It turns out that policy decisions (i.e., choices concerning γπ) are important
not only to describe asymptotic properties of the equilibrium under learning,
but also to determine the speed at which the distance between PLM and ALM
shorten over time.
Figure 1 plots the mapping from PLM to ALM (2.12) and shows how private
agents’ estimates aﬀect actual inﬂation along the transition to the REE.
Fig 1
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10This coincide with checking wether the derivative of the mapping from PLM to ALM is
smaller than 1.
6First of all note that if the slope of the mapping is smaller than 1, the REE is
E-stable. In other words, if the economy starts from a perceived level of inﬂation
aL < aπ or aH > aπ, the mean of the prediction error (i.e., the mean distance
between the ALM and the T(.)m a p p i n g ) ,T (aπ,t) − aπ,t, decreases over time
and asymptotically converges to zero (i.e., it converges to the point aπ).
Is there any diﬀerence between a policy that results in the slope of T(.)
equal to 0.01 and one with the slope equal to 0.99? The recent literature on
monetary policy and learning (Evans and Honkapohja 2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2003
and Bullard and Mitra 2002), by focusing on asymptotic properties of the equi-
librium, does not answer this question. Since in both cases the REE is unique
and E-stable, both policies are “good”11.
In the literature, the problem of the speed of convergence of recursive least
square learning algorithms has been analyzed mainly through numerical pro-
cedures and simulations12. The few analytical results are obtained by using a
theorem of Benveniste, Metiver and Priouret (1990) that relates the speed of
convergence of the learning process to the eigenvalues of the associated ordi-
nary diﬀerential equation (ODE) at the ﬁxed point13. In the present case, the
ODE to be analyzed is the one described in expression (2.14) and the associated
eigenvalue is the slope of the mapping from PLM to ALM (2.12).
The following propositions, adapting arguments in Marcet and Sargent (1995),
show that by choosing the γπ, the policy-maker not only determines the level
of inﬂation in the long run, but also the speed at which the distance between
perceived and actual inﬂation narrows over time.
Proposition 1 Let us deﬁne
S1 =
½
γπ : γπ >
αϕ + β − 1/2
αϕ
¾













[1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ)]
(2.15)
Proof. See Appendix A.
If the conditions of Proposition 1 are satisﬁed, the estimates aπ,t converge to
the REE, aπ,a tr o o t - t speed. Root-t is the speed at which, in classical econo-
metrics, the mean of the distribution of the least square estimates converges
to the true value of the parameters estimated. Note that the formula for the
11Here, and thereafter, with “good” policy I refer to the criterion used by Bullard and Mitra
(2002) to evaluate policy rules, based on determinacy and E-stability of the REE
12Orphanides and Williams (2003) have recently analyzed the role of monetary policy deci-
sions along the transition to the REE by means of simulations.
13See see for example Marcet and Sargent (1995) for an interpretation of the ODE.
7variance of the estimator aπ is modiﬁed with respect to the classical case where
σ2
a = α2σ2
g. Proposition 2 shows that for lower values of γπ convergence is
slower.
Proposition 2 Under the simple expectations-based reaction function (2.3), if
γπ ∈ S1, then the weaker the response to expected inﬂation (the smaller γπ),
the greater the asymptotic variance of the limiting distribution, σ2
a.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Looking at the formula for the asymptotic variance (2.15) it is easy to un-
derstand the role of policy decisions in determining the speed of convergence to
the REE: for a weaker response to expected inﬂation, the convergence is slower
in the sense that the asymptotic variance of the limiting distribution is greater.
What happen when the slope of the mapping (2.12) is smaller than 1, but









S2, the estimates aπ,t converge to the REE aπ, but at a speed diﬀerent from
root-t. In this case, as Marcet and Sargent (1995) suggest, the importance of
initial conditions fails to die out at an exponential rate (as it is needed for root-t
convergence) and agents’ beliefs converge to RE at a rate slower than root-t.I n
particular, even when γπ ∈ S2 it is possible to show by means of simulations that
as the slope of the T(.) mapping increases, the speed of convergence decreases14.
Figure 2 shows examples for the two cases where γπ ∈ S1 and γπ ∈ S2.
Since the least squares algorithm adjusts each parameter towards the truth
when new information is received, the new belief aπ,t+1 will be an average of
the previous beliefs aπ,t and the actual value T (aπ,t) plus an error. When
the reaction of the policy maker to expected inﬂation is strong (γπ ∈ S1), the
derivative of T (.) is smaller than (or equal to) 1/2a n dT (aπ,t)i sc l o s et oaπ;
when the reaction is weak (γπ ∈ S2), the derivative of T (.) is larger than 1/2
and T (aπ,t)i sc l o s et oaπ,t instead of being close to aπ, so the average can stay
far from the REE for a long time.
14See section 4 for simulations that relate speed of convergence and the slope of the T()
mapping.
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It is worth noting that even though the transition is quite diﬀerent in the
two cases analyzed here, the learning equilibrium could end up converging to the
same REE and, according to policy-maker preferences, the speed of convergence
could become a relevant variable in the policy decision problem.
2.3 Optimal monetary policy under discretion
The reason the analysis started with the simple expectations-based reaction func-
tion (2.3) was that it simpliﬁed the dynamics under learning. I now consider the
optimal monetary policy problem without commitment (discretionary policies),
where any promises made in the past by the policy-maker do not constrain cur-
rent decisions. In deriving the optimal discretionary policy, I follow Evans and
Honkapohja (2002), assuming that the policy-maker cannot manipulate private
agent’s beliefs. This assumption implies that the optimality conditions derived
under learning are equivalent to the ones obtained under RE.
The policy problem consists in choosing the time path for the instrument it















t + λ(xt − x)
2
i
subject to the constraints (2.1) and (2.2) and E∗
t πt+1, E∗
t xt+1 given.
9The solution of this problem15, as derived in Evans and Honkapohja (2002),
yields to a reaction function that relates the policy instrument it to the current
state of the economy and private agents’ expectations:
it = γ  + γ 
xE∗
t xt+1 + γ 
πE∗
t πt+1 + γ 
ggt (2.16)
where γ  = − λ
(λ+α2)ϕx, γ 
x = γ 
g = 1




Since interest rate rule (2.16) states that the policy maker should react
to the expected inﬂation and output gap, it is sometimes called the optimal
expectations-based reaction function (Evans and Honkapohja, 2002). However,
to stress the fact that this policy is optimal under rational expectations but is not
necessarily optimal under learning, it would be worth to call it the RE-optimal
expectations-based reaction function; in order to avoid notational ﬂutter, I call
it Evans and Honkapohja (EH) policy.
Under rational expectations (i.e. E∗
t xt+1 = Etxt+1 and E∗
t πt+1 = Etπt+1)
the equilibrium is:
πt = Etπt+1 = aπ and xt = Etxt+1 = ax, (2.17)
Assuming that private agents do not know aπ and ax but estimate them
recursively, the expected inﬂation and output gap evolve as described in section
2.2, while the mapping from PLM to ALM is now given by
T (aπ,t,a x,t)=
¡











Again, since the right-hand side of (2.18) does not depend on ax,t, properties
of the equilibrium under learning can be described simply by focusing on the
mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation.
Evans and Honkapohja (2002) showing that policy (2.16) results in a unique
and E-stable REE conclude that the policy derived as the optimal solution of
the problem under discretion and rational expectations is also “good” under
learning.
Now, if we simulate the model under the RE-optimal expectations-based re-
action function, and Clarida, Gal` ı and Gertler (2000) calibration16,i tt u r n so u t
t h a tt h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h ea c t u a li n ﬂa t i o na n dt h eR E Ew o u l db es i g n i ﬁca-
tively diﬀerent from zero for many periods17.
15Ic o n s i d e rλ as an exogenous policy parameter, as is often done in monetary policy litera-
ture. An alternative approach is to obtain λ as the result of the general equilibrium problem.
In this case λ w o u l dd e p e n do nr e p r e s e n t a t i v ec o n s u m e rp r e f e r e n c e sa n dﬁrms’ price setting
rules.
16Clarida, Gal´ ı and Gertler (2000) derive from regressions on US data, ϕ =1 , α =0 .3,
β =0 .99, ρu =0 .35; Woodford (1999) ﬁnds ϕ =0 .17, α =0 .024, β =0 .99, ρu =0 .35. In
Figure 3 I assume λ =0 .5
17In simulations, the weight that is attributed to the initial belief plays an important role.
In equation (2.9), an initial t very small would imply a much higher weight to the present
than to the past. In general, the bigger the t, the higher the weight given to previous belives.
Here I consider t0 =2 .
10Figure 3 shows the evolution of perceived inﬂation under learning. Assuming
that the policy-maker follows a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy rule with λ =
0.3, the output gap target is x =0 .02 and using CGG calibration, the REE
for inﬂation is around 2 per cent. I consider an initial expected inﬂation 1
percentage point higher than the REE. After 1000 periods (quarters) perceived
inﬂation is still 0.2 percentage points higher than the REE18.
Fig 3
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Applying a similar argument to that used in Propositions 1 and 2 it is
possible to state the following proposition about the speed of convergence and
the role of the weight to output gap in the welfare function, λ.
Proposition 3 Under the EH policy, the speed of convergence of the learning
process depends negatively on the weight that the policy-maker gives to output
g a pr e l a t i v et oi n ﬂation. In particular, under ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policies
(λ>0), the greater the weight to output gap, the slower the learning process.
Proof. See Appendix C.
Proposition 3, by looking at the slope of the mapping from perceived inﬂation
to actual inﬂation, relates the speed of convergence of the learning equilibrium
t ot h ei m p o r t a n c eo fo u t p u tg a pi nt h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o n .
18With Woodford (2003) calibration the convergence is even slower.
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Figure 4 shows how the slope of the mapping from the PLM to ALM of
inﬂation changes as the weight that the policy-maker gives to the output gap
relatively to inﬂation increases19. When the policy-maker cares equally about
output gap and inﬂation (λ = 1), the slope of the mapping is around 0.9; when
he cares less about output gap than inﬂation the slope is smaller (for example
if λ =0 .5, then the slope is 0.84) but, unless λ is smaller than 0.1, root-t
convergence is never reached.
The fact that the learning speed could be very slow (or very fast) depending
on policy decisions20, suggests that when they consider the monetary policy
problem under learning, policy-makers should take into account the transition
to the REE. E-stability is not itself suﬃcient to characterize policies in a con-
text of adaptive learning, and policy (2.16), which is optimal under rational
expectations, may not be optimal under learning.
In the following sections I show that, in general, the analysis of the speed of
convergence is helpful in evaluating policy rules.
3 Speed of convergence and policy design
Let us consider a third and more generic set of expectations-based reaction func-
tions
it = γ + γxE∗
t xt+1 + γπE∗
t πt+1 + γggt (3.1)
19I use the Clarida, Gali and Gertler (CGG) calibration for US. Similar results obtain with
the Woodford (W) calibration.
20This result could be applied to the problem of “optimal delegation”, justiﬁng a conserva-
tive central bank when fast convergence is required.
12and show how to characterize the elements of this set using a measure of the
speed of convergence.
Under a generic expectations-based reaction function, the economy evolves
according to the following expression:
Yt = Q + F × E∗




















(β + αϕ(1 − γπ)) α(1 − ϕγx)
ϕ(1 − γπ)( 1 − ϕγx)
¸
. (3.4)
and the REE is of the form
Yt = A + Sgt, (3.5)
If private agents do not know A but estimate it recursively, expected inﬂation
and output gap evolve in a more complex way then described in section 2. As
both the IS and the AS relations also depend on the expected output gap21,
the learning process cannot be described only by focusing on beliefs regarding
expected inﬂation (see Appendix D for a complete description of the learning
mechanism in this case).
Expectations are given by:
E∗
t Yt+1 = At, (3.6)
where elements in At are estimated similarly to (2.9).
Lemma 4 is a slight generalization of a result obtained in Bullard and Mitra
(2002) and describes the necessary and suﬃcient conditions under which the
REE (3.5) is E-stable.
Lemma 4 Under a generic expectations-based reaction function (3.1), the nec-














Proof. See Appendix D.
Figure 5 shows, with CGG calibration, all the combinations (γπ,γx)u n d e r
which the REE is E-stable.
21Under generic expectations-based reaction functions (3.1) the elements in the second col-
umn of the F matrix are not necessarily zero.
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Note that, since the EH policy (2.16) is an element of the set of generic
expectations-based policy rules (3.1), points A and B represent the combination
γ 
π,γ 
x in the two extreme cases where policy-makers do not care about the
output gap, λ =0( p o i n tA), and where they give equal weight to both inﬂation
and the output gap, λ =1( p o i n tB). Figure 5 shows that in both cases the
REE is E-Stable22.H o w e v e r ,f o rλ = 1 this is very close to the bounds of the
E-stability region; in this case, if the policy-maker chooses the EH policy rule,
but improperly calibrates the model it can easily end up outside the stability
region, enforcing a non-stationary policy.
Finally, the fact that the origin is not in the stable region is consistent with
the non-convergence result of Evans and Honkapohja (2002): policies that react
only to shocks, ignoring expectations, are unstable under learning.
3.1 The transition to the REE
In the previous sections, policy-makers settled the coeﬃcients of matrix F,b y
means of reaction functions. This means that the evolution of estimated coeﬃ-
cients in private agents’ forecasts (i.e., the speed at which private agents learn)
strictly depends on policy decisions.
Proposition 5 provides conditions for root-t convergence.

















22It is possible, moreover, to show that for any positive and ﬁnite value of λ, i.e., for
all ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policies under the EH policy (2.16) the rational expectation
equilibrium is E-Stable (Evans and Honkapohja, 2002).
14then √
t(At − A)
D → N (0,Ω)













g =0 ( 3 . 9 )
Proof. See Appendix E.
Under the generic expectations-based reaction function (3.1), if the REE
is E-stable but conditions in Proposition 5 are not satisﬁed, then not all the
eigenvalues of the matrix F have real part smaller than one half. In this case,
as suggested in section 2, the learning equilibrium converges to the REE at a
slower rate than root-t. Figure 6 shows all combinations of γπ and γx for which
there is root-t convergence.
Fig 6














By comparing Figure 5 and Figure 6, it is apparent that the set of combi-
nations (γx,γπ) resulting in root-t convergence is much smaller than the one
under which E-stability holds. Points A and B in Figure 6 show the combina-
tion γ 
π,γ 
x, i.e., the reaction to expected inﬂation and output gap under the EH
policy rule, in the two extreme cases where policy-makers do not care about the
output gap, λ =0( p o i n tA), and where they give equal weight to both inﬂation
and the output gap, λ =1( p o i n tB). As derived in section 2, Figure 6 shows
that when the policy-maker gives weight λ =1t h e r ei sn oroot-t convergence.
In the previous sections, in order to characterize how policies determine the
speed of converge to REE, I focused only on one policy parameter at a time (γπ
in section 2.2 and λ in section 2.3). Here, on the contrary, since the speed of
15convergence is determined by the eigenvalues of F and this matrix depends on
both γπ and γx, it is necessary to focus on two policy parameters at a time.
For this reason I deﬁne the speed of convergence isoquants that map elements
of the set of expectations-based reaction functions into a speed of convergence
measure23.
Deﬁnition 6 A speed of convergence isoquant is a curve in R2 along which
all points (i.e., combinations (γπ,γx) of an expectations-based reaction function
(3.1)) result in the same real part of the largest eigenvalue z1of the matrix F.
For simplicity I restrict the analysis to the set
Γ = {γπ,γx : γπ > 0,γx > 0a n d0≤ z1 < 1}.
The following deﬁnition and proposition describe the main properties of the
speed of convergence isoquants:
Deﬁnition 7 The speed of convergence, represented by the speed of convergence
isoquants, is monotonically increasing in the reaction to expected inﬂation (γπ)
if, given the reaction to the expected output gap (γx), the real part of the largest
eigenvalue z1of the matrix F is decreasing in γπ.
A similar deﬁnition for monotonicity with respect to the expected output
gap could be settled.
Proposition 8 The speed of convergence relation, represented by the speed of
convergence isoquants and deﬁned over Γ is: (i) monotonically increasing in
γπ, (ii) not monotonic with respect to γx.
Proof. See Appendix F.
Proposition 8 states that, for a given reaction to output gap expectations, the
policy-maker, by increasing the reaction to expected inﬂation increases mono-
tonically the speed at which private agents learn. On the contrary, for a given
reaction to expected inﬂation, by increasing the reaction to the expected output
gap, private agents could learn both faster or slower, depending on the value of
γπ.
Figure 7 shows the speed of convergence isoquants: the lower the isoquant,
the slower the convergence. In fact, the larger the real part of z1, the lower the
isoquant and, from Marcet and Sargent (1995), the larger the real part of z1,
the slower the convergence.
23In the deﬁnition I relate speed of convergence to the eigenvalues of the matrix F.I n
general, as shown in previous sections, the speed of convergence is related to the eigenvalues
of the derivatives of the mapping from PLM to ALM, T(A). In this case, the derivative is
equal to F.
16Fig 7
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Figure 7 illustrates a practical way of using speed of convergence in order to
characterize monetary policies. For example, a combination of γπ and γx just
above the isoquant z1 =1( p o i n tB) determines an E-stable REE, but would
imply very slow convergence. The combinations of γπ and γx placed above the
isoquant z1 =0 .1 imply a very fast learning process. The combinations of γπ
and γx that stay above the isoquant z1 =0 .5 imply a learning process that
converges to the REE at a root-t speed.
Let us now see how to make active use of the speed of convergence in the
study of optimal policies under discretion.
4 Discretionary policy and learning
Evans and Honkapohja (2002) say that the expectations-based reaction function
(2.16) is not only a “good” policy because it determines an E-stable REE,
but it also “implements optimal discretionary policy in every period and for all
values of private expectations” in a context where “private agents behave in a
boundedly rational way”. In order to identify EH policy (2.16) as the optimal
policy under discretion and learning, however, the crucial assumption is that
“the policy-maker does not make active use of learning behaviour on the part of
agents” (Evans and Honkapojha, 2002).
If, under rational expectations, the problem of optimal “discretionary policy”
implies, by deﬁnition, that policy-makers cannot aﬀect private agents’ expec-
tations, under the hypothesis of bounded rational private agents, since policy
decisions aﬀect the learning process, a rational policy-maker with full informa-
tion should take transition into account. In fact, if private agents’ expectations
17are the result of estimations that depend on past values of the monetary pol-
icy instrument, the policy-maker’s decisions, will aﬀect future estimates and,
consequently, the private agents’ learning process. EH policy (2.16) is not nec-
essarily optimal under learning but could be deﬁned as asymptotically-optimal.
However, if private agents’ perceived law of motion is well speciﬁed, once the
learning process has converged to rational expectations, not only the policy rule
(2.16) will be optimal, but the following Lemma says that there is a continuum
of expectations-based policy rules that result in the same REE.
Lemma 9 Under rational expectations, in the set of expectations-based reac-
tion functions (3.1) there are inﬁnitely many elements, i.e. combinations of
γ,γx,γπ,γg that result in the optimal REE for {πt,x t} deﬁned in (2.17).
Proof. See Appendix G.
Since all the policies that in the long run result in the same optimal alloca-
tion, could determine diﬀerent transitions to the REE, a device for discriminat-
ing between them is required24. The speed of convergence isoquants derived in
the previous section could be a useful starting point.
Let us consider a characterize set of asymptotically-optimal expectations-
based reaction functions that allow to completely oﬀset demand shocks, as under
the EH policy.
Proposition 10 The maximum speed of convergence of the learning process
that could be reached under the restricted set of asymptotically-optimal expectations-
based reaction functions,














x, depends negatively on the weight that the policy-maker gives to output
g a pr e l a t i v et oi n ﬂation.
Proof. See Appendix H.
Proposition 10 states that under the set of reaction functions (4.1), the
economy converges asymptotically to the optimal REE under discretion, but
for a given λ the policy-maker can bring about a diﬀerent speed of convergence.
Note, instead, that under EH policy (2.16), each λ was associated with a given
speed of convergence. In particular, under asymptotically optimal expectations-
based reaction functions (4.1), the larger the relative weight on output gap,
λ, the larger will be the real part of the biggest eigenvalue of the F matrix
and the slower the fastest speed of convergence that a policy-maker can reach.
Figure 8 shows, in the same picture, the speed of learning isoquants and, for
given λ, combinations of γx and γx under which the economy will converge
asymptotically to the optimal REE under discretion.
24“There is no single policy rule that is uniquely consistent with the optimal equilibrium.
Many rules may be consistent with the same equilibrium, even though they are not equiva-
lent insofar as they imply a commitment to diﬀerent sorts of out-of equilibrium behaviour”
(Svensson and Woodford, 1999).
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The line λ = 0 shows that if the policy-maker does not care about the
output gap, by imposing γπ = γ0
π, he can choose combinations of γπ and γx
such that the speed of convergence ranges from very slow to very fast: the line
λ = 0, in fact, intersects isoquants z1 =0 .1 (very fast speed), z1 =0 .7 (speed of
convergence slower than root-t) and many others. If, instead, the relative weight
to output gap is one half, i.e., the line λ =0 .5, the policy-maker could choose
only combinations of γπ and γx such that the speed of convergence is slower
than root-t: the line λ =0 .5 does not intersect any isoquant with z1 ≤ 0.5;
if the policy-maker cares equally about inﬂation and output gap, i.e., the line
λ = 1, he can choose only combinations of γπ and γx such that the speed
of convergence is very slow, slower than root-t, since the line λ = 1 does not
intersect any isoquant with z1 ≤ 0.7.
Points A and B in Figure 8 also show another important result that will be
analyzed further in the next section: for a given value of λ there are inﬁnitely
many expectations-based policies that determine asymptotically the same REE,
but induce a faster (or slower) speed of convergence than the one determined
by EH policy (2.16).
4.1 The mapping from PLM to ALM
In order to show how the central bank can make active use of private agents’
learning behaviour in the monetary policy problem under discretion, I now
consider more in detail the mapping from perceived to actual variables.
In section 2.3 I have shown that the analysis of the transition to the REE,
under EH policy stands on the mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual in-
19ﬂation
T (aπ,t)=Φ∗ + Γ∗aπ,t (4.2)
and the necessary and suﬃcient condition for E-stability reduces to Γ∗ < 1.
To give an example, since I consider λ to be an exogenous policy parameter,
let us assume that the policy-maker gives a positive weight λ =0 .3( n o t et h a t
with this weight I assume that the policy-maker cares more than three times
more about inﬂation than about output gap). In this case the mapping T (aπ,t)
has a slope equal to 0.76 under CGG parametrization. Figure 9 shows the
mapping from PLM to ALM. Even if initial perceived inﬂation is not too far
f r o mt h eR E E ,s i n c et h es l o p eo ft h eT(.) mapping is close to 1, the transition
from the learning to the RE equilibrium is very slow.
Fig 9
The mapping from PLM to ALM under the EH policy
(λ = 0.3)
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4.2 Adjusting the learning speed
The question now is whether a policy-maker who wants to reach in the long
run the same REE determined by the EH policy (2.16) can speed up or slow
down the private agents’ learning process. To answer to this question in a very
intuitive way I consider a subset of asymptotically optimal policies that allow
to oﬀset not only demand shocks, but also expected output gap movements, as
under the EH policy25.
Deﬁnition 11 The Adjusted Learning Speed-Γ0 (ALS-Γ0) policy rule, is an
25At the beginning of this section I showed an asymptotically-optimal policy (4.1) that
allowed a choice to be made among diﬀerent speeds of convergence. However, under that
policy, the analysis of the learning dynamics involved a mapping from PLM to ALM with
both perceived inﬂation and output gap. Here, instead, I consider a policy that allows a
choice between diﬀent speeds of convergence just by looking at a mapping from PLM to ALM
involving only expected inﬂation, as under the EH Policy.
20expectations-based reaction function
iALS
t (Γ0)=γALS + γALS
x Etxt+1 + γALS
π Etπt+1 + γALS
g gt (4.3)













where 1 < Γ0 < 0 is the slope of the new mapping from perceived inﬂation to




Φ∗ + Γ0aπ,t. (4.4)
Note that, under least square learning, the ALS-Γ0 policy leads to a mapping














that does not depend on the perceived output gap. Therefore, in order to study
convergence to the REE, as under EH policy, the analysis can focus on the
mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation (4.5).
Figure 10 shows the new mapping T0 (aπ,t)u n d e rt h eALS-Γ0policy.
Fig 10
The mapping from PLM to ALM under the ALS-Γ0 policy
(Γ0 < Γ∗)
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In particular, it can be observed that T0 (aπ,t) has the same ﬁxed point, aπ,
as under the EH policy,b u tt h ei n t e r c e p ta n dt h es l o p ea r ed i ﬀerent. The policy-
maker, in order to speed up (slow down) the transition to the REE can follow
an expectations-based reaction function that induces a rotation of the mapping
from PLM to ALM around the ﬁxed-point (i.e., the REE), with a slope Γ0 lower
(higher) than under the EH policy.
The following proposition formalizes this result.
21Proposition 12 Under rational expectations, the ALS-Γ0 policy results in the
same REE for {πt,x t} derived under the EH policy. Under least squares learn-
ing, the ALS-Γ0 policy results asymptotically in the same REE for {πt,x t} de-
rived under the EH policy.
Proof. See Appendix I.
Taking parameters α,ϕ,β as given, under the EH policy, the speed of con-
vergence relies entirely on λ.B yc h o o s i n gaλ the policy-maker is also choosing
the slope of the T (.) mapping (in the previous example, with λ =0 .3, the slope
was equal to 0.7 6 )a n d ,a ss h o w ni ns e c t i o n2 ,h ed e t e r m i n e st h es p e e do fc o n v e r -
gence. However, under ALS-Γ0 policy, the policy-maker could choose separately
the relative weight on output gap and the speed at which agents learn without
aﬀecting the REE.
Lemma 13 Under ALS-Γ0 policy (4.3) the speed of convergence does not depend
on the relative weight to outputg gap.
Proof. See Appendix L.
Comparing now EH and ALS-Γ0 p o l i c i e s ,w eh a v et h a t
Lemma 14 T h er e s p o n s eo fi n t e r e s tr a t et oar i s ei ne x p e c t e di n ﬂation is higher
under the ALS-Γ0 than under the EH policy if Γ0 < Γ∗,i sl o w e ri fΓ0 > Γ∗.
Proof. See Appendix M.
The following proposition and its corollary formally compare the transition
under ALS-Γ0 and under the EH policies.
Proposition 15 Assume that private agents form expectations through recur-
sive least squares learning and that initial perceived inﬂation is the same under
both ALS-Γ0 and EH policies but diﬀerent from the REE. Now, if the reac-
tion to expected inﬂation is stronger under ALS-Γ0 than under EH policy, i.e.
γALS
π >γ ∗
π, then perceived and actual inﬂation will be closer to the REE under




Proof. See Appendix N.
Corollary 16 Consider two ALS policies iALS (Γ0
1) and iALS (Γ0
2) with 0 <
Γ0
1 < Γ0
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The intuition is the following: if the policy-maker reacts strongly to a change
in expected inﬂation, the diﬀerence between private agents’ expectations and
actual inﬂation will be greater and prediction error will be initially bigger; if
private agents make larger errors they will adapt their estimates faster and both
expected and actual inﬂation will move closer to the REE. In other words, the
22stronger the policy-maker’s response to a change in private agents’ expectations,
the faster private agents learn and the shorter the transition to the REE.
The fact that under the ALS policy for every 0 <t<∞ the distance from the
REE could be smaller (greater) than under the EH policy brings to the following
question: how long does it take under the two policies to get ε-close to the REE,
i.e., starting from the same distance from the REE, |aπ,0 − aπ| >ε ,h o wm a n y
periods are needed under the two policies in order to get |πt − aπ| <ε ?
Assuming that the policy-maker follows a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy
rule with λ =0 .3, the output gap target is x =0 .02 and using CGG calibration,
ﬁgure 11 compares the results of a simulation under the EH policy and under
an ALS-Γ0 policy with Γ0 =0 .3 (i.e., root-t convergence is imposed). Given
that the REE for inﬂation is around 2 per cent, I consider an initial expected
inﬂation 1 percentage point higher than the REE.
Fig 11















Under the ALS-Γ0 p o l i c y ,a f t e r1q u a r t e ri n ﬂation is at 2,3 per cent, after 1
year is below 2,2 per cent and after 5 years its distance from the REE is smaller
than 0,1 percentage point. On the contrary, under EH policy, after 1 quarter
inﬂation is at 2,8 per cent, after 1 year is still close to 2,6 per cent and after 20
years inﬂation is still 0,4 percentage points higher than the REE.
Table 2 compares the transition to the REE for diﬀerent ALS-Γ0 policies.
23Tab 2
Transition under the ALS-Γ0 policy
(Quarters neede in order to have (πt − πREE) smaller than)
γALS
π Γ0 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 0.2% 0.1%
4.0 0.1 11113
3.3 0.3 1123 1 5
2.6 0.5 1 2 5 14 120
2.3 0.6 1 3 13 41 610
20 . 7 1 7 43 225 > 1000
1.81 0.76 3 14 147 > 1000 > 1000
1.6 0.8 5 26 463 > 1000 > 1000
1.1 0.95 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000 > 1000
1For γALS
π =1 .8, the ALS and EH policies coincide, when λ =0 .3.
Let us consider, for example, the ALS-Γ0 with γALS
π =3 .3. Given that
in equilibrium inﬂation is 2 per cent and assuming an initial expectation at 3
percent, inﬂation can be reduced by more than 0.5 percentage point, in:
-1 /2 of the time needed under the ALS-Γ0 with γALS
π =2 .6
-a p p r o x i m a t e l y1 /7 of the time needed under the ALS-Γ0 with γALS
π =2
-1 /14 of the time needed under the EH policy!
Moreover, under the ALS-Γ0 with γALS
π =2 .6, that allows root-t conver-
gence, inﬂation can be reduced by more than 0.7 percentage point, in approxi-
mately 1/30 of the time needed under EH policy.
This section looked at the role of policy decisions in determining the speed
of convergence under learning, focusing on the mapping from perceived inﬂation
to actual inﬂation. Before asking how the policy-maker can make use of his role
to increase social welfare, the following lemma concerns the behaviour of the
output gap along the transition.
Lemma 17 Under EH and ALS policies, when initial perceived inﬂation is
higher (lower) than the REE, the output gap converges to the REE from below
(above).
Proof. See Appendix N.
Now it is possible to return to the question addressed at the beginning of the
paper: is the EH policy still optimal under learning? Are policies that speed up
the learning process always better than policies that involve a slow transition
to the REE?
5 Welfare analysis
In January 1999, with the start of stage 3 of the Economic and Monetary Union,
monetary competencies were transferred from each country of the European
24Union to the European Central Bank. Before that date people were accus-
tomed to take into account the monetary policy of their own country when
making economic decisions. After the start of stage 3, they faced a new policy-
maker (and a new monetary policy) and inﬂation and output gap equilibria
determined under the new policy regime were, in some cases, diﬀerent from the
ones implied by the previous policies. Let us consider, for example, countries
like Italy or Spain, whose rates of inﬂation are historically higher than in other
member states, and assume that in those two countries expected inﬂation at the
start of the EMU was higher than the REE determined by the new monetary
regime. Under the assumption that private agents need time to learn the new
equilibrium, it is clear that the dynamics of the learning equilibrium along the
transition to the REE play an important role in the analysis of monetary policy
decisions based on welfare measures. Questions like the ones raised at the end
of the previous section show up spontaneously.
To answer to those questions I consider separately the two cases where initial
expected inﬂation is higher than the REE and where it is lower. The reason why
I proceed in this way is twofold. First, under adaptive learning, when the policy-
maker chooses the policy, he already knows private agents’ expectations and he
could infer wether the initial bias in agents’ prediction is positive or negative.
Second, the welfare implications diﬀers in the two cases. In the literature it is
well known that under the loss function described in section 2.3 the ﬁrst best
plan would be, for all t,t oh a v ei n ﬂation and output gap at their target levels,
i.e., πFB
t =0a n dxFB
t = x. As many works have shown, under no commitment,
the ﬁrst best solution is not feasible if x 6= 0. The optimal (time-consistent)
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t for all t
Under learning, however, inﬂation and output gap could remain far from
the REE for a long time. Therefore, if initial perceived inﬂation is higher than
the REE, as in previous section, actual inﬂation will be higher and output gap
lower than the REE along the transition. In this case, a policy-maker who bases
decisions on the loss function described in section 2.3 would prefer policies that
make inﬂation fall and output gap rise quickly to the REE. On the contrary, if
initial perceived inﬂation is lower than the REE, the policy-maker would prefer
policies that make inﬂation climbing and output gap landing slowly to the REE.
Since EH policy is not taking into account the transition, I claim that there are
ALS-Γ0 policies that will make our economy better oﬀ.
26Under CGG parametrization, assuming λ =0 .5, the REE would be
πt =1 .57 ∗ x and xt =0 .05 ∗ x
25In order to verify this claim, let us start by assuming that the EH policy
(which is optimal under RE) is also optimal when private agents form expec-
tations through adaptive learning. The aim is to compute the welfare cost of
alternative monetary policies, i.e., ALS-Γ0, that asymptotically result in the
same REE as the EH policy, but along the transition result in diﬀerent learning
equilibria.
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As a measure of the welfare loss (gain) I consider the percentage increase
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Ir u ns i m u l a t i o n s 27 of the model for 10000 periods, assuming that the policy-
maker follows a ﬂexible inﬂation targeting policy rule with λ =0 .3, the output
gap target is x =0 .02 and using CGG calibration. The REE for inﬂation is
around 2 per cent. I consider an initial expected inﬂation 1 percentage point
higher than the REE and I compute social losses under the EH and ALS-Γ0
policies for diﬀerent values of γALS
π (i.e., diﬀerent Γ0).
Figure 13 shows that ALS-Γ0 policies with Γ0 < Γ∗, by inducing a fast
convergence, reduce the social loss up to 20 per cent relative to EH policy.
Policies with Γ0 > Γ∗, on the contrary, increase the social loss by up to 30
per cent. In particular, a central bank that follows an ALS-Γ0 policy with
γALS
π =2 .6 can, by increasing the speed of convergence to root-t,l o w e rt h e
value of the loss function by 15 per cent relative to the EH policy.
27In the following simulations I consider as AR(1) stochastic process for the demand shock,
with ρg =0 .95 and εgt ∼ N (0,0.05)
26Fig 13
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In order to analyze how the percentage increase (decrease) in the social loss
evolves along the transition simulations are also run for T<10000 periods.
Table 3 shows the results, pointing out that most of the gain from using an
ALS-Γ0 policy with fast transition is concentrated in the ﬁrst 20 quarters.
Tab 3
Percentage loss in total welfare after T quarters (π0 >π RE)
γALS
π Γ0 T=10 T=20 T=50 T=100 T=10000
4.0 0.1 −18,3 −22 −23,6 −23,2 −21,9
3.3 0.3 −15,0 −18,5 −20,3 −20,4 −19,6
2.6 0.5 −10,2 −12,8 −14,4 −15,1 −15,0
2.3 0.6 −7,0 −8,9 −10,4 −10,9 −11,0
1.6 0.8 2,12 ,83 ,43 ,73 ,9
1.1 0.95 13,01 7 ,22 2 ,52 5 ,72 9 ,0
Figure 14 and Table 4 show that under the assumption of an initial ex-
pected inﬂation 1 percentage point lower than the REE, by inducing a slower
convergence, the policy-maker could greatly reduce the welfare loss.
27Fig 14
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A central bank that follows an ALS-Γ0 policy with γALS
π =1 .1c a n ,b y
increasing the slope of the mapping from perceived inﬂation to actual inﬂation
to Γ0 =0 .95, slow down the transition and lower the value of the loss function
by approximately 30 per cent relative to the EH policy. On the contrary, a
policy-maker who speeds up the transition to root-t convergence, following an
ALS-Γ0 policy with γALS
π =2 .6, would increase the value of the loss function by
approximately 25 per cent relative to the EH policy. Again, Table 4 shows that
most of the loss from using an ALS-Γ0 policy with fast transition is concentrated
in the ﬁrst 20 quarters, while advantages from inducing a slow convergence are
distributed along the transition.
Tab 4
Percentage loss in total welfare after T quarters (π0 <π RE)
γALS
π Γ0 T=10 T=20 T=50 T=100 T=10000
4.0 0.1 60,75 5 ,24 7 ,54 2 ,33 6 ,3
3.3 0.3 44,84 3 ,33 9 ,53 6 ,23 1 ,9
2.6 0.5 26,42 7 ,52 6 ,92 5 ,72 3 ,6
2.3 0.6 16,31 7 ,81 8 ,21 7 ,81 6 ,9
1.6 0.8 −3,6 −4,4 −5,1 −5,2 −5,3
1.1 0.95 −14,3 −19,7 −25,1 −27,7 −30,1
Finally, under the assumption that initial expected inﬂation is random and
28distributed symmetrically28 around the REE ﬁgure 15 shows that if the policy-
maker does not take into account the initial bias in agents’ prediction, ALS-Γ0
policies that induce a slower convergence than under EH policy would be slightly
preferable than policies that determine a fast convergence. In particular, the
maximum gain in welfare can be obtained under the ALS-0.9 policy.
Fig 15
Percentage loss in total welfare
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Before concluding I wish to emphasize some aspects concerning the robust-
ness of welfare results.
6R o b u s t n e s s
In the previous section the speed of convergence and welfare were studied by
running simulations with λ =0 .3a n dx =0 .02. Changing these parameters
would not change the ﬁnding that EH policy, that is optimal under rational
expectations, is not optimal under learning and that, when initial perceived
inﬂation is higher than the REE, the central bank could increase welfare by
inducing a faster transition. However, in the extreme case where x =0 ,i fi n i t i a l
inﬂation is lower than the REE, the ﬁnding that a slower convergence to the
REE increases welfare does not hold anymore. In fact, when x =0 ,i no u r
model, the optimal policy under discretion results in a REE with inﬂation and
output gap equal to the ﬁrst best, and a faster transition will always be better
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6.1 An Economy with Cost-push Shocks
The new-Keynesian model analyzed in this paper is derived assuming that only
one shock aﬀects the economy. Under this assumption the policy-maker neu-




ϕ. However, when an additional shock hits the econ-
omy (for example, a “cost-push shock”, ut) the policy-maker cannot, in general,
neutralize both shocks at the same time. In this case, since the two policies
along the transition to the REE would react diﬀerently to ut, welfare analysis
could be aﬀected. Simulations show that the introduction of a cost-push shock
aﬀects the results only in the amount of the welfare gain (or loss).
Tab 6






; T = 10000)
γALS
π Γ0 π0 >π RE π0 <π RE
4.0 0.1 −15,64 3 ,8
2.6 0.5 −11,42 8 ,1
2.3 0.6 −8,51 9 ,9
1.6 0.8 3,1 −6,2
1.1 0.95 23,5 −33,4
30Table 6 shows that adding an AR(1) shock ut in the aggregate supply equa-
tion29, when initial private agents’ perceived inﬂation is higher than the REE,
a central bank that follows an ALS-Γ0 policy with γALS
π =2 .6c a nl o w e rt h e
value of the loss function by approximately 11 per cent relative to the EH policy
(15 per cent without cost-push shocks); when initial private agents’ perceived
inﬂation is lower than the REE, an ALS-Γ0 policy with γALS
π =1 .1c a nl o w e r
the value of the loss function by approximately 33 per cent (30 per cent without
cost-push shocks).
In particular it is worth to notice that increasing the speed of convergence
also reduces the variablity of inﬂation along the transition. Figure 17 shows
that the faster the convergence, the smaller would be the diﬀerence between
the standard deviation of actual inﬂation under learning and under RE. Under
ALS-Γ0 policies with Γ0 =0 ,3, at the beginning of the transition to the REE,
inﬂation’s standard deviation is 10 per cent higher than under RE, while under
EH policy is approximately 20 per cent. After 10 years, under ALS-Γ0 policy
the standard deviation is only 5 per cent higher, while under EH policy it is 14
per cent higher.
Fig 17
Diﬀerences between standard deviation of inﬂation

















The results obtained in this section show that optimal policies derived under
RE are not optimal under learning. Using results for the speed of convergence
29Ia s s u m eλ =0 .5, x =0 .02, ut = ρuut−1 + εu,t with ρu =0 .5a n dεu,t ∼ N (0,0.05)
31could help to increase social welfare by taking into account the transition from
learning equilibrium to the REE. Solving for the true optimal policy under
discretion and learning would envolve taking into account that the policy-maker
could make active use of private agents’ learning behaviour. However, since the
optimal monetary policy has to be derived by substituting the private agents’
PLM into the objective function, it would be time-dependent. Further analysis
in this direction is required and will be left for future research.
7 Conclusions
In this paper I have shown that considering learning in a model of monetary
policy design is particularly important in order to describe not only the asymp-
totic properties of rational expectations equilibrium to which the economy could
converge, but even to describe the dynamics that characterize the transition to
this equilibrium.
The central message of the paper is that policy-makers should not only look
at monetary policies that determine a stable equilibrium under learning, but
also take into account how policy decisions aﬀect the speed at which learning
converges to rational expectations. In particular, under certain policies, the
REE is E-stable, but the period needed to converge to this equilibrium could be
incredibly long. Reacting strongly to expected inﬂation, a central bank would
shorten the transition and increase the speed of convergence from the learning
equilibrium to the REE.
A policy-maker who considers his role in determining the dynamics of the
private agents’ learning process could choose a policy rule that induces agents
to learn at a given speed, aﬀecting the welfare of society. In particular, if the
policy-maker knows that after a regime change private agents’ perceived inﬂation
would be higher than the REE, by choosing a policy that reacts strongly to
expected inﬂation he would determine a fast convergence and could increase
social welfare. If, instead, perceived inﬂation is initially lower than the REE, a
slow transition is preferred when the output gap target is greater than zero, a
fast transition when the target is equal to zero.
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338A p p e n d i x
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Given the recursive stochastic algorithm
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t−1 (−αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ,t−1 + αgt−1 − aπ,t−1)
let
h(aπ)=[ −αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ − aπ]
and let aπ besuchthath(aπ) = 0. By the theorem of Benveniste et. al.(Theorem











a + E [−αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ − aπ + αgt]
2 =0
Note that the derivative of E [−αϕγ +[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)]aπ − aπ] being smaller
than −1/2c o i n c i d e sw i t h[ β + αϕ(1 − γπ)] being smaller than 1/2, i.e., γπ being
larger than 1 −
1/2−β
αϕ
B. Proof of Proposition 2













[1 − β − αϕ(1 − γπ)]
2α2σ2
g < 0
C. Proof of Proposition 3
The argument is similar to the one used in the proof of Propositions 1 and
2.




For values of λ> α2
2β−1 there is no root-t convergence and convergence will be
slower.
34D. Proof of Lemma 4







where aπ,t and ax,t are estimated recursively
aπ,t = aπ,t−1 + t−1 (πt−1 − aπ,t−1)
ax,t = ax,t−1 + t−1 (xt−1 − ax,t−1)





= Q + FAt
Thus the mapping from PLM to ALM takes the form
T (A0
t)=Q + FA t
Consider the stability under learning (E-stability) of the rational expectation
solution A as the situation where the estimated parameters At converge to A
over time.




(A0)=T (A0) − A0
For this framework E-stability conditions are readily obtained by computing the
derivative of T (A0)−A0 and imposing that the determinant of the matrix with
the derivatives of the previous diﬀerential equation with respect to A is greater
than zero and the trace of the matrix with the derivative is greater than zero.
In particular, the eigenvalues of F, z1 and z2, must have real parts less than
one (let us deﬁne the biggest eigenvalue of the F matrix as z1).
Then, let us distinguish between the two cases:
1. The “real” case.
In this case two conditions must be satisﬁed in order to have convergence
to the REE:
(a) For reality
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) > 0
(b) z1 < 1 implies




Since by hypothesis z1 ≥ z2,i fz1 < 1t h e na l s oz2 < 1.
352. The “complex” case.
In this case two conditions must be satisﬁed in order to have convergence
to the REE:
(a) For the solution to be imaginary,
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) < 0
(b) Real part of z1 < 1 implies










Since by hypothesis z1 ≥ z2,i fz1 < 1t h e na l s oz2 < 1.














E. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n5
Consider again the mapping from PLM to ACL under the least square learn-
ing hypothesis:
T (A0
t)=Q + FA t
From Marcet and Sargent (1992) it follows that in order to have root-t
convergence the eigenvalues of F must have the real part smaller than 1
2.
Then, let us distinguish between the two cases:
1. The “real” case.
In this case two conditions must be satisﬁed in order to have convergence
to the REE:
(a) For reality
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) > 0








Note that if z1is smaller than 1
2 then even z2 is smaller than 1
2.
362. The “complex” case.
In this case two conditions to be satisﬁed in order to have root-t conver-
gence:
(a) For the solution to be imaginary,
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) < 0
(b) Real part of z1 < 1
2 implies












Note that if z1is smaller than 1
2 then even z2 is smaller than 1
2.

















F. Proof of Proposition 8
Consider the set Γ = {γπ,γx : γπ > 0,γx > 0a n d0≤ z1 < 1}.













∈ Γ,w i t hγ2
π ≥ γ1
π, w implies a value for the real part of z1
smaller or equal to the one with h.
Proof. z1 is the biggest eigenvalue of F:
z1 =





(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx)
2






∈ Γ such that z1 = z1
1 is real. In this case
(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2 − 4β (1 − ϕγx) > 0












∈ Γ with γ2
π ≥ γ1
π.

























π + ε)) + β +( 1− ϕ(γ1
x)))
2 − 4β (γ1
x)
2
There could be two cases:
1. w is such that z2
















Now, it is obvious that z2
1 − z1
1 < 0 and monotonicity with respect to γπ
is satisﬁed.
2. w is such that z2
1 is complex. In this case z1
1 should be compared with the


















(αϕ(1 − γπ)+β +( 1− ϕγx))
2
< 0
monotonicity with respect to γπ is satisﬁed.







1 is complex. In this case only the real
part of z1
1 is of interest.






,i nt h i sc a s ekw − hk =
h¡
γ1





the point (γπ,γx)=w, the biggest eigenvalue of F, z2


























Note now, that if z1
1 is complex, z2
1 cannot be real: if z1




















































¢¢2 , i.e., z2
1 is complex. In this
case it is obvious that monotonicity with respect to γπ is satisﬁed.



















∈ Γ such that z1
1 and z2
1 are complex. In
this case it is easy to see (using a similar argument to the previous proof) that
z1
1 ≤ z2





















1 are real and it is easy to see that z2
1 ≤ z1
1.
38G. P r o o fo fL e m m a9
Substituting the value of the conditional expectations into (2.21), the opti-
mal policy rule could be written as:










This expression says that the policy-maker should oﬀset demand shocks
(gt) by adjusting the nominal interest rate in order to neutralize any shock
to the IS curve. Since this optimal policy rule involves only the fundamentals
of the economy (demand and supply shocks), it could be deﬁned as the optimal
fundamentals-based reaction function under rational expectations (Evans and
Honkapohja (2002))30.
Now, consider a generic expectations-based policy rule of the form:
it = γ + γxEtxt+1 + γπEtπt+1 + γggt
Assuming rational expectations, expected values could be substituted in the
previous expression to obtain the following policy rule:
it =( γ + γxax + γπaπ)+γggt
By comparing this equation with the optimal fundamentals-based policy rule,
a system of two equations on four unknowns (γ,γx,γπ,γg) is obtained:
γR =( γ + γxax + γπaπ)
γR
g = γg
Obviously, this system has multiple solutions.
H. P r o o fo fp r o p o s i t i o n1 0
By considering the values of the coeﬃcients of the reaction function γ∗
g,
γ∗,γR and the rational expectations values ax, aπ given, the combinations of
γx and γπ are obtained that determine asymptotically the same equilibrium










30Many autors (see for example Woodford (1999)) have shown that this interest rate rule
leads to indeterminacy, i.e., a multiplicity of rational expectations equilibria.
39Consider the isoquants of Figure 8:
γπ =1−












γx for γx ≥ b γx










Restricting the analysis to the set Γβ = {γπ,γx :0<z 1 <β ,γ π > 0,γx > 0},













has a solution (use proposition 3.D.1 in Mas-Colell et al., 1995), and there is
also an indirect speed of convergence function v(λ)t h a ti ss t r i c t l yd e c r e a s i n g
on λ (use proposition 3.D.3 in Mas-Colell et al., 1995). The maximum speed of
convergence that could be induced by a combination (γπ,γx)f o rag i v e nλ will












< 0f o r z1 <β
Now, since the higher the level curve, the faster the convergence, it must be










moves downward and the fastest speed of convergence that is feasible is lower,
or in other words the smallest z1 that can be reached is larger.
I. P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 2


















































Φ∗ (1 − β)
(1 − Γ∗)α
and under learning, when both Γ0 and Γ∗ are smaller than one the REE is
E-stable.
L. P r o o fo fL e m m a1 3







given the parameters α,ϕ,β, each value of the policy reaction parameter γALS
π
has a corresponding slope of the T(.)m a p p i n g ,Γ0,i n d e p e n d e n t l yf r o mλ.
M. Proof of Lemma 14
If


















1 > Γ0 > Γ∗








the perceived inﬂation under ALS-Γ0







actual inﬂation under ALS-Γ0 and
EH policies. Assume that the economy starts from a point where the learning









I have to show that if γALS
π >γ ∗
















































I will proove the proposition for γALS
π >γ ∗






π,t h e n
Γ0 < Γ∗























































































N. Proof of Lemma 17
42Given that
xREE =
Φ∗ (1 − β)
(1 − Γ∗)α

















































































































































− aπ = Γ





























similarly for t=2,3,... and for the case aπ,0
¡
iALS (Γ0)
¢
= aπ,0
¡
iEH¢
> aπ.
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